Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

11-1-2007

Summary of Matter of Halverson, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29
Jennifer Arias
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Arias, Jennifer, "Summary of Matter of Halverson, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29" (2007). Nevada Supreme
Court Summaries. 770.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/770

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Matter of Halverson, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 48 (2007). 1
LEGAL ETHICS — JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
Summary
Judge Elizabeth Halverson was elected to the position of Eighth Judicial
District Court Judge for Clark County and took the bench in Department 23 in
January, 2007. Four months later, the General Counsel for the Nevada Commission
on Judicial Discipline (“Commission”) prepared an informal written complaint
against Judge Halverson relating to her judicial performance and treatment of staff.
On May 10, 2007, the Commission filed a written suspension order based on six
grounds.
Upon receipt of the notice of suspension, Judge Halverson then requested a
hearing (“Hearing”), at which, both the Commission and Judge Halverson presented
witnesses. Judge Halverson also requested certain subpoenas duces tecum issue for
production of documentation of all personal grievances against all Nevada Judges
since January 1, 2004. Judge Halverson’s request was denied because, as later
explained by Sixth Judicial District Court Judge Richard Wagner, the requests were
“overbroad, unduly burdensome, and requested information that was irrelevant to the
proceedings.”
Additionally, at the Hearing, the Commission allotted the special prosecutor,
who had the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that an
interim suspension was warranted, three and a half hours to present his case while
only allowing Judge Halverson two and a half hours. Following the Hearing, the
commission found that four of the original bases for the interim suspension had been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The four grounds for suspension are: (1)
inability to conduct criminal trials; (2) failure to treat staff and litigants with respect;
(3) falling asleep on the bench; and (4) not cooperating with court administration. 2
These grounds led the Commission to conclude that Judge Halverson posed a
substantial threat of serious harm to the public and to the administration of justice.
Therefore, pursuant to NRS §1.4675 (“Statute”), the Commission imposed an interim
suspension on Judge Halverson.
Judge Halverson appealed the Commission’s decision to the Nevada Supreme
Court (“Court”), arguing both that the Statute is unconstitutional on its face and that
the interim suspension proceedings themselves violated due process because of the
refusal of the subpoenas duces tecum, the allotment of extra time to the special
prosecutor at the Hearing, and finally, because the Commission had already made its
1

By Charles R. Peterson.
For the purposes of this commentary, I have not included the specific evidence presented in support
of these four grounds although the Court does analyze in the evidence in some depth and whether or
not the evidence supports the Commission’s findings. Suffice it to say the Court felt the evidence
presented supported a suspension by a preponderance of the evidence. Of course, the real issue was
whether or not preponderance of the evidence was the correct legal standard.

2

1

decision before the Hearing..
Issue and Disposition
Issue
What is the constitutional and statutory authority of the Commission to temporarily
suspend a judge, before a formal hearing, when the Commission determines that the
judge poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the administration
of justice? Specifically 3 :
(1)

What is the interplay between confidentiality of Commission
proceedings and the public nature of proceedings before the Court?

(2)

What procedural issues arise from the Nevada legislative provisions
governing the interim suspension of judges?
(a)

What standard of review must the Court apply to appeals from
temporary suspension orders?

(b)

What standard of proof must the Commission use in
temporary suspension proceedings?

(c)

What is the appropriate scope of Commission suspension
proceedings?

(d)

What tests should be applied when determining whether an
interim suspension is warranted?

(3)

Does the Commission have the authority to impose an interim
suspension before a formal statement of charges is filed?

(4)

Is the interim suspension statute void for vagueness?

(5)

Did the Commission violate Judge Halverson’s right to due proces
by refusing to issue the subpoenas, predetermining the outcome of the
case before the Hearing, and allocating more time for the special
prosecutor to present his case than Judge Halverson to present hers?

Disposition
The Court rejected almost all of Judge Halverson’s arguments. Specifically,
the Court decided:
(1)

Appeals from confidential judicial discipline matters considered by
the Court are not confidential unless a compelling interest in support
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For the purposes of this commentary, I have assigned numbers to each issue. Please note that the
number assignments are mine and not the Court’s.
2

of sealing is proffered.
(2)(a) Issues regarding standard of proof to be used by commission are to be
reviewed on appeal de novo. Decisions by the Commission to
suspend judges are, by statute, discretionary, and therefore are only
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.
(2)(b) Preponderance of the evidence standard is the correct standard of
proof for judicial interim suspension proceedings.
(2)(c) Scope of interim suspension proceedings allows the Commission to
take into account the totality of the circumstances, including past
behavior.
(2)(d) Interim suspensions are “warranted only to protect against anticipated
future harm, including harm to the public’s perception of the judicial
system, and not merely to redress past misconduct; such a suspension
is appropriate when the ‘exigencies of the circumstances presented’
would not be adequately met by formal proceedings.”
(3)

The Commission does have authority to impose an interim
suspension.

(4)

The interim suspension statute is not void for vagueness.

(5)

The interim suspension procedure used thus far in this case had not
violated due process; however, if the Commission, now that an
interim suspension is in place, unreasonably delays its investigation,
the proceedings may then violate due process.

Commentary
State of the Law Before Halverson
Most of the issues in this case are questions of first impression, although
some of the issues do have some Nevada precedent.
(1)

In Attorney General v. Steffen 4 , the Court held that confidentiality in
judicial discipline proceedings only applied to proceedings before the
Commission, and not before the Court. Although the Nevada
Constitution was amended after Steffan 5 , and a new statute was
enacted 6 , no changes were made in regards to confidentiality before
the Court.

(2)(a)-(d)

Although the Nevada Constitution, the Statute, and
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112 Nev. 369 (1996).
NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
6
NRS 1.4683 (1997).
5
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Commission on Judicial Discipline Rule 9 all provide the
Commission with the authority to impose an interim
suspension, a case involving an appeal of the Commission’s
interim suspension order had not been brought before the
Court since the revision of the judicial discipline scheme in
1997. Therefore, many procedural issues had to be decided in
this case for which there was no Nevada case law.
(3)

On the issue of interpretation of the Statute, the term “proceeding”,
and whether the Statute gives the Commission authority to
temporarily suspend a judge before a formal complaint is filed is one
of first impression in Nevada.

(4)

While the issue of whether the Statute is unconstitutionally vague, the
Court held in Silvar v. Dist. Ct. 7 that “A statute is unconstitutionally
vague and subject to facial attack if it (1) fails to provide notice
sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand
what conduct is prohibited, and (2) lacks specific standards. . .” 8

(5)

Because this is the first judicial interim suspension case brought
before the Court, the issue of whether the procedures actually used in
this case violate due process are of first impression, even though this
issue is largely fact-dependent.

Other Jurisdictions
In Halverson, the Court recognized law from other jurisdictions on issue
(2)(c), regarding the scope of the Commission’s suspension proceedings. West
Virginia 9 and Michigan 10 courts have listed factors relevant to a temporary
suspension determination. These factors include: whether the alleged misconduct:
(1) is directly related to the administration of justice or to the public’s perception of
such administration, (2) is entirely personal in nature or involves the judge’s public
persona, (3) involves violence or callous disregard for the justice system, (4) is
criminal in nature, (5) is part of a pattern or practice, (6) occurred on the bench, (7)
is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice, and (8) is premeditated. Some
mitigating factors include remorse, the judge’s record, and the judge’s efforts to
improve.
Effect of Halverson on current law
Halverson did not overturn or call into question any existing law. Instead it
has mostly taken existing legal principles and applied them to the specific cases of
7

122 Nev. 289 (2006).
Id. At 293.
9
In re Cruickshanks, 648 S.E.2d 19, 23 (W. Va. 2007).
10
In re Chrzanowski, 636 N.W.2d 758, 764 n.8, 765 n.11 (Mich. 2001).
8
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judicial interim suspensions imposed by the Commission. Halverson has interpreted
the Statute broadly, giving the Commission wide discretion in imposing an interim
suspension on judges.
First, the Court ruled that unless a compelling reason to seal is given, appeals
from suspension decisions before the Court will be matters of public record. This
could have the possible affect of discouraging appeals from interim suspension
decisions out of fear that the public would be given access to a laundry list of alleged
offenses. This is an especially relevant concern in a state with elected judges.
The procedural decisions of Halverson also give the Commission wide
discretion in a decision to temporarily suspend. Although any rulings on questions of
law will be reviewed de novo by the Court upon appeal, their decision as to whether
the facts support a suspension will only be reviewed for abuse of discretion. For an
interim suspension, only a preponderance of the evidence is required to support a
suspension, in contrast to a clear and convincing standard used in most other judicial
discipline proceedings. In deciding interim suspension cases, the Commission can
review the totality of the circumstances, including testimony concerning past events.
The Court has now confirmed that the Statute both gives the Commission the
power to impose an interim suspension and is not unconstitutional for vagueness,
and finally, it has confirmed that at least up to this point in time, the Commission’s
exercise of power under the Statute has been constitutional in that due process has
not been violated. The Court did give one warning: should the Commission
unreasonably delay proceedings once the interim suspension has been issued, there
may be a violation of due process.
Unanswered Questions
The Court, while warning that the Commission’s delay of post-interim
suspension proceedings may violate due process, did not give any guidelines as to
what would constitute a delay that violated due process. The Court only intimated
that an “undue” or unreasonable” delay would result in an increased private interest
for the affected judge and therefore more procedural safeguards would be needed. It
is foreseeable that this issue will come up again at some point as the Court, through
its dicta, has essentially extended an invitation to appeal on these grounds. That said,
given the tone of the decision, the Court has given great deference to the
Commission, and they will likely do so in the future.
Conclusion
Halverson has given the Commission broad discretion in imposing interim
suspensions and made it more difficult to appeal such suspensions; however, the
Court will not allow an the interim suspension procedure to be a “fast track” method
of imposing a permanent suspension, and after imposing an interim suspension, the
Commission will have to act with reasonable speed in its subsequent investigation
and formal proceedings.
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